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Abstract: Enhancing people’s reasoning abilities or rationality is a long and central tradition in philosophy and is the 
dominant concern of the critical movement. The research by cognitive psychologists has contributed considerably to 
our understanding of human irrationality and can enhance critical thinking instruction. The critical thinking/informal 
logic movement has not devoted sufficient attention to the decision making aspect of rationality. Unfortunately the 
norms used in the heuristics and bias literature to identify biases in decision making derive from the theory of rational 
choice used in neo-classical economic theory. These norms identify rational decision making with the efficient pursuit 
of individual satisfaction. This model is an inadequate account of decision making rationality. Such norms narrow and 
distort the concept of rationality, legitimate the single minded pursuit of self interest and their influence is a significant 
contributor to the economic and environmental problems of our day. The identification of deviations from the norms 
of rational choice theory should not generally be accepted as biases. In addition, key elements of rational decision 
making are simply ignored by the rational choice model. 
 
Keywords: critical thinking, rationality, heuristics, biases, rational choice theory, evaluative rationality, epistemic 
rationality, instrumental rationality, cognitive psychology, behavioral economics  
 
1. Introduction 
 
My intention is to critically explore the implications to the critical thinking movement by cognitive 
psychologists and behavioral economists, commonly known as the heuristics and bias research.   
But first I wish to position the critical thinking movement in the long historical tradition of 
philosophy that has been devoted to development and spread of rationality. From Socrates to John 
Dewey, from 5th century Athens to 21st century Windsor the promotion of rationality has been 
recognized as a core philosophical project.  
It is a project not always adequately respected and appreciated in contemporary 
professional philosophy. In part because critical thinking was seen as remedial, but in fact 
promoting rationality is a cross curriculum challenge and responsibility. Despite this lack of 
disciplinary support, the critical thinking movement has grown to the extent that practically 
everyone now wants students to learn to “think critically” and many post-secondary institutions 
identify critical thinking as their key learning outcome. Business also wants employees and 
especially management to think critically.  
This acceptance and recognition provides these of us in the critical thinking movement 
have an opportunity and responsibility not far different from that of the philosophers of the 
Enlightenment. Enlightenment philosophers virtually changed the course of history by advocating 
for scientific reasoning and rationality to replace the old deference to church and king. What is 
sometimes known derisively as the Enlightenment Project, for all its over reach, had a momentous 
and largely beneficial effect on the thinking and politics of western civilization. The critical 
thinking movement is the inheritor of this project and I suggest that we now think of the critical 
thinking movement as the Critical Thinking Project. But for this analogy to be appropriate critical 
thinking instruction must expand to include all of rationality.  
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2. Expanding the focus of The Critical Thinking Project 
 
The theory then was that the barrier to rationality was ignorance of the rules of rational argument 
and that with proper instruction in the rules of reasoning and argumentation, students would be 
able to identify and resist fallacious arguments—it was principally (well almost) “Logical self 
defense.”  
 
 
But as the heuristics and biases literature began to permeate the Critical Thinking Project 
there was realization that, as the famous Pogo carton reminds us, we are also the problem. Not that 
this was exactly a new idea. As Socrates admonished “Know thyself” was a key prerequisite to 
rational thought.  
The heuristics and biases literature focuses primarily on the inherent biases of our cognitive 
equipment. The identification of this source of erroneous reasoning adds significant insights useful 
to critical thinking instruction—insights which are now being recognized in the Critical Thinking 
/Informal logic literature. But before we make use of this research we must subject it to a critical 
evaluation.  
 
3. Expanding The Critical Thinking Project 2: rational decision making 
 
Despite Harvey Siegel’s claim that a critical thinker is someone “appropriately moved by reason” 
and Bob Ennis’ definition of critical thinking as “reasonable reflective thinking focused on 
deciding what to believe or do” critical thinking has, historically limited itself to a subset of 
rationality primarily involving epistemological norms such as identifying and avoiding fallacies, 
argument analysis and evaluation, and more recently reasoned judgment. But rationality and 
critical thinking include not only deciding what to believe but also what to do, as both Ennis and 
Siegel indicate. Critical thinking is not limited to applied epistemology as I and others have argued, 
but also includes applied rational decision making.    
While the critical thinking movement has failed, by and large to address rational decision 
making, neo-classical economics has dominated  the concept of rationality as it applies to decision 
making and used it to promote  a narrow minded, individualistic and self interested view of 
rationality known as rational choice theory. The Critical Thinking Project must recover the 
concept of rationality from the neo-classical economists.   
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Many of the insights emerging from heuristic and bias literature are of great use to the 
Critical Thinking Project. However the research on decision making biases is undermined by use 
of the norms of rationality embedded in rational choice theory. Today I will focus on heuristics 
and biases research on decision making rationality both because it has received less attention than 
the research on epistemic biases, and more importantly, because this model which describes 
rationality as the efficient pursuit of individual self interest legitimates an ideological position as 
if that were rationality itself.  
Let me start with the concept of bias. 
4. What is a bias?  
To claim that a person has a bias or is biased in a particular area of judgment is to claim that the 
person has a tendency to make judgments or engage in actions that violate the appropriate and 
relevant norms of that area. 
Examples: refs favouring the home team, scientists only attending to supportive 
information, people believe their experiences are representative of human experience, favouring 
male candidates in hiring   
It is obvious that the Achilles heel of this definition is “appropriate and relevant norms.” 
Short of infinite regress, the norms themselves need rational justification. 
The norms of reasoning that are used in the bias and heuristic literature is not limited to the 
traditional norms of rationality, or the norms of deductive logic. The norms also include the laws 
of probability theory and norms used in rational choice theory (particularly expected utility). The 
norms of probability are not contentious, but as indicated, the norms that assume people should 
make decisions in accord with expected utility theory i.e. in line with their long term self interest, 
are contentious.  
5. Tversky and Kahneman 
Two Israeli psychologists, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, did much of the initial research, 
and created the heuristics and bias nomenclature for this enterprise. Tversky and Kahneman set 
out to demonstrate the descriptive inaccuracies of the model of human behavior built into neo-
classic economics.  
As Kahneman recollects “One day in the early 1970s, Amos handed me a mimeographed 
essay by a Swiss economist named Bruno Frey, which discussed the psychological assumptions 
of economic theory. I vividly remember the color of the cover: dark red. Bruno Frey barely recalls 
writing the piece, but I can still recite its first sentence: “The agent of economic theory is rational, 
selfish, and his tastes do not change” (Kahneman 2011). 
Tversky and Kahneman created a series of ingenious experiments which demonstrated the 
descriptive inaccuracy of the rational economic agent used in the neo-classical mathematical 
models of the economy. Their research did not call into question the notion that selfishness was 
the sole motivation of human behavior, but their research did call into question the extent to which 
people reasoned in accord with model of rationality used by economists. In the process they 
spawned the vast heuristics and bias research. Their work led to the development of a now widely 
accepted model of human judgment known as the dual process model. The model, as suggested 
by the title of Daniel Kahneman’s best selling  review of this literature, Thinking Fast and Slow, 
states we have two modes of judgment: an algorithmic/intuitive mode that is quick and a slower 
more reflective mode—the latter the kind of thinking encouraged in critical thinking courses.  
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The dominant “fast process” usually serves us well enough and apparently served our 
antecedents well enough to become genetically embedded in our thinking processes. Of course not 
all fast and intuitive processes are “natural.”  When we learn to drive a car we acquire all sorts of 
quick intuitive processes necessary for effective driving—assessing speed, appropriate following 
distance etc. Experts also often learn quick intuitive responses that are reliable, e.g. chess masters. 
But on some occasions and in reference especially to probabilistic reasoning, this fast intuitive 
process tends to lead to erroneous or biased judgments. These biases have been identified in a wide 
range of experiments by cognitive psychologists.  
6. The great rationality debate  
As many of you probably know there were considerable negative reactions to the early work of 
Tversky and Kahneman especially to the inference that their studies showed that people were 
irrational in their probabilistic judgments. There were basically two arguments. 1. That subjects 
misunderstood the questions about likelihood and therefore their judgments were reasonable given 
their understanding of the questions. And 2. that the way that people reasoned must by definition 
be rational so that their answers did not violate relevant norms of rationality. Without going into 
all the replies, both objections were credibly addressed by the fact that subjects, once they were 
shown the relevant calculus, understood why their responses were incorrect. In addition, people 
who were statistically sophisticated and understood the normatively correct answers still felt the 
pull of their intuitive answers while conceding that the intuitive judgment was incorrect. Similar 
objections can arise in relation to people’s deviations from the norms of rational choice theory but 
as I will show, those objections are more cogent.  
7. Epistemic biases 
Turning first to the research on epistemic biases. There are two excellent introductions to this 
material:  the best selling Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman and a more academic and 
comprehensive text: Thinking and Reasoning by John Baron.  
Many of the classic experiments are no doubt known to most of you. But let me quickly 
review the most famous initial results which are also quite relevant to critical thinking.  
Basically we tend to intuitively judge the likelihood of an event based on a number of 
factors: 
 
 Representativeness: An event that looks like a stereotype is judged to be more 
likely. 
 Availability: If the event is easy to imagine it is judged to be more likely. This 
ease of imagining can be a function of remembering it happening or 
remembering hearing about it (the power of the media), or because a description 
of its happening is plausible (good story) and easy to imagine. 
 Vividness If the event is emotionally powerful it is judged to be more likely. 
 
Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that these psychological factors lead to the violation 
of a basic and quite simple principle of probability: the principle of conjunctive probability: the 
conjunct of two events is never more probable than either of the events. 
This tendency is not just common to the statistically naive. For example, the following 
problem of choosing which of two events was more likely was given  graduate students a majority 
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of them committed the classic fallacy of rating the more complex (but easily imagined) event as 
more likely.  
 
1. A massive flood somewhere in North America next year, in which more than 
1,000 people drown  
2. An earthquake in California sometime next year, causing a flood in which more 
than 1,000 people drown (Kahneman 2011, p. 131) 
 
Choosing 2 over 1 involves violating the conjunctive rule of probability. But when making 
most judgments of likelihood we don’t “do the math.” We make an intuitive judgement on the 
basis of one or more of the heuristics identified above. Availability and vividness can work 
together to make an event seem even more likely. All these factors (representativeness, narrative 
plausibility, availability and even vividness) come into play to empower what critical thinkers 
know as the fallacy of appeal to anecdotal evidence. 
While philosophy has a long tradition of identifying this fallacy, the experiments of 
Tversky and Kahneman provide experimental illustrations demonstrating just how ubiquitous and 
powerful is our natural tendency to believe that our experience is and will be “representative” of 
such experiences generally. Availability is also a function of plausibility—making a plausible 
causal story for example, as in the above example, makes it easier to imagine an event and 
increases our sense of its likelihood. Ironically, the assumption of representativeness tempts even 
researchers to over generalize from their research to the population in general.  
Nor are professors of critical thinking immune from the siren call of anecdotal evidence as 
this cartoon by Leo Groake reminds us: 
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The literature on cognitive biases contains a large number of other epistemic biases relevant 
to critical thinking such as:  
 base rate neglect,  
 anchoring,  
 confirmation bias,  
 hindsight bias,  
 myside bias, etc   
But in this paper I wish to focus on the biases of instrumental rationality that are identified mainly 
in the research produced by behavioral economists. 
8. Instrumental rationality: rational choice theory and biases 
The norms of rational choice theory—the mathematically elegant theory developed in the early 
50’s provides the theoretic base for most neo-classical economic models. The theory assumes that 
humans fit (and ought to fit) the model of “homo economicus” or “econs” as they are called in the 
behavioral economics literature. For econs all decisions are self interested, well informed, based 
on unchanging tastes and in conformity with expected utility theory—the model that horrified 
Kahneman when he first read of it. Unfortunately it is these norms that provide the basis for 
identifying decision making errors and biases. 
While economists admit that rational choice theory is an idealization of actual behavior, 
they have argued that it is no worse an idealization than Newton’s frictionless plane and is equally 
theoretically useful. Starting in the late 70’s the claim that rational choice theory was an 
appropriate way to build a supposedly empirical economic theory was called into question not only 
by the research of Tversky and Kahneman but also by the emerging field of behavioural 
economics. The crash of 2008 may well have been the coup de gras to the view that real world 
financial actors such as bankers act rationally. But it is important for our purposes to understand 
that while behavioral economists have demonstrated the descriptive inaccuracy of the assumption 
that humans are “econs,” they still accept the associated norms of rationality. As a result, the biases 
identified in the heuristics and bias literature as decision making irrationalities presume that the 
description of humans as econs is the normatively correct description of the “rational person.”   
The critiques of econs as appropriate models of human beings and rational choice theory 
as an appropriate descriptive model of human behavior are long standing. Indeed the idea that all 
actions are motivated by self interest was effectively critiqued by Bishop Butler in 18th century. 
Behavioral economists argue that this view of human nature is factually incorrect, but generally 
fail to criticise the associated norms—their goal is to identify the descriptive inaccuracy of rational 
choice theory not criticize its norms.  
For example, the entertaining and insightful behavioral economist Dan Ariely states in the 
introduction to his book The Upside of Irrationality: 
 
...there is a flip side to irrationality, one that is actually quite positive. Sometimes 
we are fortunate in our irrational ability because, among other things, they allow us 
to adapt to new environments, to trust other people, to enjoy expending effort and 
to love our kids. (Ariely 2010, p. 12) 
How very odd that the abilities described by Ariely should be characterized as irrational. But not 
odd if you realize the definition of rationality that he is using. 
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As he says: “From a rational perspective, we should make only decisions that are in our 
best interest (“should” is the operative word here)” (Ariely 2010, p. 5). 
Kahneman is sensitive to this criticism, he states: 
 
I often cringe when my work with Amos is credited with demonstrating that human 
choices are irrational, when in fact our research only showed that Humans are not 
well described by the rational-agent model. (Kahneman 2011, p. 333) 
But as can be seen from this quotation he does not go as far as to say that the norms of the rational-
agent model are faulty.  
Before dealing with the obvious moral failures of the “econ” norms of rational behavior, I 
wish to look at some of the tendencies (so-called biases) identified in the behavioral economic 
literature that are supposed examples of common human irrationality. 
The norms of rational choice are purely “product” norms. They provide a criteria for 
assessing a decision, but not for assessing the decision making process. This is different from many 
of the norms of rationality used to identify epistemic biases which reference procedural norms e.g. 
confirmation bias. This focus places significant limitations on the usefulness of rational choice 
theory as a guide for rational decision making. But first the theory. 
The fundamental principle of rational choice theory is that to be rational people must be 
consistent in their preferences. If they prefer A over B and B over C then they should prefer A 
over C and should do so over time and in all situations. The principle sounds reasonable enough 
but its emphasis on unchanging preferences turns out to have significant and dubious implications 
because it requires our decision making to be indifferent to context.  The other key aspect of 
rational choice theory is the theory of expected utility—a theory based on the notion of a good 
bet. 
9. Expected utility theory 
While expected utility theory is in principle applicable to any outcome most of the discussion 
focuses on financial gambles. A good gamble is one which if played in the long run will result in 
your being ahead of the game, i.e. winning more than losing. The best gamble is the option that 
will yield the most financial return in the long run.  In more mathematical terms: the expected 
utility of a gamble is equal to the probability of the outcome multiplied by amount of the outcome 
minus any cost of the gamble. 
There are a number of obvious practical difficulties in acting in accord with rational choice 
theory. One obvious difficulty is that we are often confronted with decisions without knowing the 
probability of the various outcomes. The next obvious problem is that the utility of an outcome is 
subjective. This has led theorist to redefine outcomes in terms of preferences rather than utility. 
As a result economists generally talk about preference maximizing not utility maximizing. But 
since they mainly talk about money, they assume that individual preferences will be to attain the 
maximum financial benefit. 
But even when people know the probabilities and payoffs involved, there are many 
situations in which most people do not adhere to the norm of expected utility—and quite 
reasonably so. For example in most situations the majority of people prefer an outcome that is 
certain rather than an iffy bet even if the iffy bet would provide a greater payoff in the long run. 
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10. Certainty bias—or a reasonable preference? 
Tversky and Kahneman used the following question as one of the ways to illicit the certainty effect. 
 
Which of the following options do you prefer? 
A. a sure gain of $30 
B. 80% chance to win $45 and 20% chance to win nothing  
In this case, 78% of participants chose option A while only 22% chose option B (value $36). This 
illustrates most people’s tendency to favour the more certain bet over the less certain bet despite 
its greater expected utility (the expected value of B exceeds that of A by 20%) (Kahneman 2011, 
pp. 364-365). 
The fact that people violate the norms of expected utility theory does not of course prove 
them irrational. For example consider the purchase insurance which in theory violates expected 
utility theory. 
11. Loss aversion: context counts   
 
Even before the work of Tversky and Kahneman, it was noted that people favoured certainty over 
the promise of long term gain. It was thought that this was because people were risk averse. This 
analysis of peoples’ decision making was derived in large part from the work of Daniel Bernoulli 
(1738) who devised a model of risk aversion which used the declining utility of the dollar to also 
explain apparent deviations from choosing the “best bet.”  
But Tversky and Kahneman noted that people were influenced in their assessment of the 
utility of a financial outcome by considerations other than their current state of wealth. Tversky 
and Kahneman’s research showed people tended to be loss averse not risk averse. Loss aversion 
has two implications:   
 
1. People are only tempted by a bet in which the gain is much greater than the 
possible loss. 
 2. If a person sees their situation as a loss, e.g. have already lost a bet or suffered 
financial reversal, they are now willing to take a greater risk to return to a “no loss 
situation” than they would if they were not already in a loss situation.  
For example consider the following problems: 
 
Problem 1: Which do you choose?  
(a) Get $900 for sure OR  (b) 90% chance to get $1,000  
 
Problem 2: Which do you choose?  
(a) Lose $900 for sure OR (b) 90% chance to lose $1,000 
 
If you are like most people you will chose (a) in the first problem but (b) in the second. This 
tendency can lead to all sorts of risky efforts to make up for losses widely seen for example in 
compulsive gamblers, but also stock brokers (Kahneman 2011, p. 224). 
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The inclinations to accept or reject a gamble are mostly intuitive system 1 choices. And 
they clearly do not accord with the norm of expected utility theory which would ignore the framing 
of the gamble as loss or gain i.e. ignore the context in which a decision is being made. 
As mentioned, rational choice theory treats context (e.g. history, financial situation, social 
situation, cultural context) as irrelevant. Decisions that take these types of considerations into 
account and result in changing preferences will be judged as inconsistent and “biased” by the 
theory. 
 
12. Percentage framing 
 
Tversky and Kahneman have also shown other ways that contexts influence our decision making. 
For example:  
 
Imagine that you are about to purchase calculator for $15. Another customer tells 
you that the calculator you wish to buy is on sale for $10 at another store, located 20 
minutes’ drive away. Would you make a trip to the other store? 
 
In contrast imagine this time that you are buying a jacket for $125 and you learn that 
you can save $5 dollars on the jacket by driving to another store, would you drive 20 
minutes to save the $5? 
 
In one typical experiment, 68% of the respondents were willing to drive to the other branch 
to save $5 on a $15 calculator, but only 29% of respondents were willing to make the same trip to 
save $5 on a $125 jacket (Kahneman 2011, p. 367). 
Irrational? From the economist’s point of view 5 dollars is 5 dollars and the context (or 
frame) of the purchase is irrelevant. But not to most humans. Can our tendency to assess a saving 
in light of the context lead to irrationality? Yes, but is it fundamentally irrational?—only if you 
are an econ. 
13. Mental accounting: budget categories 
1. Imagine that you have decided to see a play and paid the admission price of $50 
per ticket. As you enter the theater, you discover that you have lost the ticket. The 
seat was not marked, and the ticket cannot be recovered. Would you pay $50 for 
another ticket? (Yes (46%) No (54%)  
2. In the alternative, imagine that you have decided to see a play where admission is 
$50 per ticket. As you enter the theater, you discover that you have lost a $50 bill. 
Would you still pay $50 for a ticket for the play?  (Yes (88%) No (12%) (Kahneman 
2011, p. 368) 
 
Why are so many people unwilling to spend $50 after having lost a ticket, if they would 
readily spend that sum after losing an equivalent amount of cash? The difference is our mental 
accounting. The $50 for the ticket was spent from the play “account”—that money is already spent, 
the loss of the cash is not posted to the play “account” and it affects the purchase of a ticket only 
by making the individual feel slightly less affluent. 
As Kahneman admits, while this framing violates the economic rationality principle that 
only the amount of money counts not the context, most people do it.  
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The normative status of the effects of mental accounting is questionable. ... it can be argued 
that the alternative versions of the calculator and ticket problems differ also in substance. In 
particular, it may be more pleasurable to save $5 on a $15 purchase than on a larger purchase, and 
it may be more annoying to pay twice for the same ticket than to lose $50 in cash. Regret, 
frustration, and self-satisfaction can also be affected by framing (Kahneman and Tversky 1982).  
So the theory is saved by considerations such as “If such secondary consequences are 
considered legitimate, then the observed preferences do not violate the criterion of invariance and 
cannot readily be ruled out as inconsistent or erroneous.”  As long as you posit subjective utilities 
as explanation (and these utilities can be “rationally” influenced by frames) you can save the 
normative theory. But why not just say that the theory is an inadequate account of the norms of 
rational decision making?  
For econs all money is money and this sort of mental accounting incorrectly allows the 
influence of budget category framing. But for those of us who try to keep on budget, or for any 
bureaucratic institution, budget categories serve a very important and rational purpose. . 
 
14. Endowment effect 
The endowment effect is the tendency to value something we have more than we would pay to get 
it. Another example from Thaler: 
 
One case came from Richard Rosett, the chairman of the economics department 
and a long time wine collector. He told me that he had bottles in his cellar that he 
had purchased long ago for $ 10 that were now worth over $ 100. In fact, a local 
wine merchant named Woody was willing to buy some of Rosett’s older bottles at 
current prices. Rosett said he occasionally drank one of those bottles on a special 
occasion, but would never dream of paying $ 100 to acquire one. He also did not 
sell any of his bottles to Woody. This is illogical. If he is willing to drink a bottle 
that he could sell for $ 100, then drinking it has to be worth more than $ 100. But 
then, why wouldn’t he also be willing to buy such a bottle? In fact, why did he refuse 
to buy any bottle that cost anything close to $ 100? As an economist, Rosett knew 
such behavior was not rational, but he couldn’t help himself. (Thaler, p. 17) 
 
While Rosett is reported as unable to control himself, is it really irrational to value what you have 
more than what you would currently pay? It appears that even a well informed economist is not 
inclined to follow the dictates of rational choice theory. The emotionally and intellectually rational 
heuristic: “stick with (love?) what you have”—seems an eminently sane inclination and supportive 
of happiness. Irrational?    
15. Summary 
 
The model of rationality used by neo-classical economists has a key limit which is the insistence 
on the irrelevance of context e.g. loss, commitment, ownership, frame, etc. While only a brief 
review of the research, these examples supports the view that the “biases” indentified in the 
research on instrumental rationality do not have the same status as those identified in the studies 
of epistemic biases. The results of the study of instrumental rationality are best described as 
common tendencies not biases in the pejorative sense. It may well be that these intuitions which 
“violate” econ rationality contribute to our long run well being. 
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An even more troubling implication of the rational choice approach to decision making is 
the lack of consideration of moral norms relevant to decision making. For example, fairness. 
16. Fairness: The ultimatum game 
To illustrate this point, take the interesting economic experimental paradigm called the Ultimatum 
Game. In the Ultimatum Game there is a sender and a receiver. The sender is given some money, 
typically $20 dollars and can make any split of the money with a receiver with whom they have 
no direct contact.  The sender decides how to split the money and then offers a share to the receiver. 
If the receiver accepts the offer they both get the split money, if the receiver rejects the offer neither 
get the money.  
If you are an econ, you take any offer—a buck is buck, but contrary to economic thinking 
most receivers refuse offers of anything less than about 40% because of the unfairness.  
 
17. The snow shovel price 
 
Here is another example that illustrates people’s concern with fairness and rejection of supposedly 
rational economic behavior. Markets obtain equilibrium between supply and demand because 
people raise prices when demand goes up—at least until new supplies arrive. This is the much 
extolled method by which a free market economy is supposed to stay in equilibrium between 
supply and demand. But when a couple of hundred Canadians were given this scenario 
 
A hardware store has been selling snow shovels for $ 15. The morning after a large 
snowstorm, the store raises the price to $ 20. Rate this action as: Completely fair, 
acceptable, somewhat unfair, or very unfair. 
 
18% judged it acceptable while 82% found this basic economic strategy to be unfair. On the other 
hand when the same problem was put to MBA’s 76% judged it acceptable and only 24% unfair. It 
appears that taking economics can have the effect of making you into a fairness-indifferent econ 
(Thaler, pp. 127-128). It appears that that instruction in economics (including the norms of rational 
choice theory) can have a significantly negative influence on people’s moral sense. (See: Frank et 
al.) 
 
18. Evaluative rationality 
The lack of fairness as a criterion of rational decision making reflects a more general problem with 
the rational choice approach to decision making. Not only does the econ notion of rationality have 
no place for moral considerations such as fairness, it also has no place for reflection on the goals 
or preferences of actors. Clearly one can have reasonable and unreasonable goals and desires, and 
one can deliberate about goals rationally or irrationally; most importantly one can have concerns 
about collective outcomes that are not reducible to an aggregate of individual preferences (e.g. the 
environment).  
Basically what the theory leaves out is evaluative rationality—rational decision making 
not about how to efficiently realize chosen ends. Evaluative rationality concerns the process for 
rational choice of ends, involving not only a rational assessment of one’s self interest but also 
relevant moral considerations.  
There are two related issues here: rational choice of individual ends and rational choice 
of collective ends. Neither is well treated in rational decision theory, though there is work by 
MARK BATTERSBY 
12 
Kahneman and others on people’s unreliable assessment (affective forecasting as it is known) 
about how they will feel when they experience certain outcomes. In general people overrate how 
happy they will be when achieving desired outcomes (cf. lottery winners studies) but also how 
unhappy they will still be when they experiencing misfortunes or disability (Kahneman 2011). 
The complexity and subtlety of hedonic experience make it difficult for the decision maker 
to anticipate the actual experience that outcomes will produce. Many a person who ordered a meal 
when ravenously hungry has admitted to a big mistake when the fifth course arrived on the table. 
The common mismatch of decision values and experience values introduces an additional element 
of uncertainty in many decision problems. 
The last chapters of Thinking Fast and Slow document the extent to which people are 
generally poor at predicting how they will feel when they achieve or fail to achieve chosen 
objectives. There are numerous studies that detail how poorly humans are at affective forecasting. 
For students faced with a wide range of life and career choices, this research can be very helpful 
in informing reflection on individual choices. 
19. Collective rationality and citizenship 
A more egregious problem with rational choice history is its lack of concern for the common good. 
Mapped onto collective decision making, rational choice theory entails a commitment to seeing 
the common good as the maximizing the aggregate satisfaction of individual (selfish) preferences. 
It is an essential part of the myth of the free market that “rational” econs pursuing their private 
interests will result in the best possible outcome for all. 
But as we are all aware, the pursuit of individual preferences (rational or not) can lead to 
collective defeat. Examples range from traffic jams to the collapse of the east coast fisheries to 
most troublingly, global climate change. Everyone prefers to utilize fossil fuels, and while no one 
intends to degrade the environment, the pursuit of individual preferences results in conditions that 
are harmful to everyone. 
Thinking that the only consideration in rational decision making is your preferences 
implies that those concerned about the environment are either irrational or simply that 
environmentalist just have different “preferences” than those whose preferences are self interested. 
There is work in cognitive psychology that addresses effective deliberative processes 
which I will briefly review, but that literature does not address questions of fairness, intrinsic 
values, collective goods etc. But there is a discipline that does: moral and political philosophy. 
Recent philosophical work on deliberative democracy treats deliberation about the common good 
as the fundamental rational element of democracy (Elster).        
I propose therefore that the study of evaluative rationality be explicitly added to the corpus 
of rational reflection addressed by the Critical Thinking Project.  
While this not the place to attempt to articulate the concept of applied rational decision 
making, it seems clear that it would differ from rational choice theory in rejecting maximizing 
utility as the only norm and in being a truly usable guide to rational decision making. It would be 
a set of guidelines to insure that the process of decision making took into account all relevant 
considerations: factual, moral, political and personal. 
20. Group decision making 
There is research on group decision making, but the notion of collective or political rationality—
how we in fact make and how we should make decisions about the collective goods is poorly 
developed. This is because the research tends to assume that the issue facing groups is either 
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epistemological or only to identify the effective means to a given end, not to deliberate about the 
choice of ends. For example the studies of the decision making process of juries focus only on the 
question of epistemic not evaluative rationality (whereas in actual jury deliberations concerns 
about the justice of the law may trump factual concerns). 
Collective rationality also involves the norms of argumentation. The proper conduct of 
such discourse is crucial to coming to a reasoned judgment about what to do or believe. 
To some extent the issue of collective rationality is addressed in informal logic through the 
study of argumentation and pragma-dialectics, but there is also work in psychology on the study 
of group dynamics. Again there is psychological and sociological literature that is useful but needs 
to be critical evaluated. The Critical Thinking Project should address both the norms of rational 
discourse and procedures for facilitating group rationality. Perhaps surprisingly, there is research 
which supports the notion that groups can often be more epistemologically rational when making 
decisions than individuals. The reason for this is that group discussion can involve participants 
putting forward differing points of view. The research on individual rationality underlines that the 
most useful heuristic for rational evaluation is to consider counter evidence and counter arguments. 
A properly constituted group should have people with alternative points of view or if necessary 
have people assigned as devil’s advocates to make counter arguments and argue for alternative 
views (Lunenburg 2012). 
The problems of confirmation bias, myside bias, even sunk costs can often be addressed 
effectively in group discussion. In addition, the research suggests that people make the best 
decisions when they are required to justify them in the process, subjecting them not only to their 
own critical reflection, but also to that of others. Presumably this is as true or perhaps truer for 
moral and political reflections. 
There are, of course, well known ways in which group decision making can go awry—e. 
g. the notorious problem of “groupthink” The research literature provides helpful information on 
how this can be avoided (Kerr & Tindale 2004; Kerr, MacCoun, & Kramer 1996). 
Based on the best research on collective decision making, The Critical Thinking Project 
needs to develop and teach practical and inclusive guidelines for collective rational decision 
making. 
21. The dialectical tier: some possible objections 
Many of the criticisms of the norms of economic rationality are long standing and widely accepted 
outside the discipline of economics, but one may question the appropriateness of introducing 
concern for the common good or criticisms of economics into the Critical Thinking Project. 
Conservative critics of critical thinking already suspect it is a covert means for teaching liberal 
ideology. 
Two responses to this anticipated objection: 
1. Neo-classical economics and rational choice theory are covert way of introducing ideology 
under the guise of simple logical principles and needs to be countered. 
As Thomas Piketty comments: 
“To put it bluntly, the discipline of economics has yet to get over its childish passion 
for mathematics and for purely theoretical and often highly ideological 
speculation...” 
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2. The push from behavioural economics to revise the behavioural assumptions of economics is an 
attempt to save economics for its obsessive mathematical idealizations, but not from normative 
ideology. To teach rationality we will need principles of reasonable decision making and cannot 
rely on the econs’ view because of its use in the heuristics and bias literature. Addressing rational 
decision making as it applies to evaluating ends and to collective decision making requires a 
broader and less ideological approach to making rational decisions than provided by rational 
choice theory norms. 
Another objection to increasing the ambit of critical thinking to include evaluative and 
collective decision making is that these areas are highly controversial and do not lend themselves 
to Critical Thinking Project instruction the way that other norms of reasoning do. Rational choice 
theory ignores the decision making process, but critical thinking has always focused on 
deliberative processes for assessing claims and the same approach is appropriate for decision 
making. In its simplest form a check list of relevant considerations about ends and means when 
making a decision could go a long way to making most people’s decision more rational. In the 
same way, decisions about collective goals can be subject to widely accepted considerations e.g. 
respect for minority rights, considerations of fairness and justice, collective well being, etc.  
22. The Critical Thinking Project 
The inadequacy of the model of rationality used in economics and now widely popularized in 
books about human decision making requires that those concerned about rationality and critical 
thinking expand their efforts and promote a corrective view of rationality.  
I propose therefore that those in critical thinking adopt what I have called the Critical 
Thinking Project, to improve people’s reasoning by: 
1. Expanding the concept of critical thinking to include evaluative rationality and rational 
decision making in its most inclusive sense 
2. Developing an alternative model of rational decision making with usable guidelines for 
a rational decision making process  
3. Making critical use of research coming 
out of cognitive psychology and 
behavioral economics to help identify 
tendencies in human judgment that can 
lead to irrationality 
4. Developing interdisciplinary research 
projects with researchers that are 
concerned with the application of reason 
to judgment and decision making—in 
particular cognitive psychologists, 
behavioural economists and applied 
decision theorist in business faculties. 
5. Teaching for evaluative rationality and rational decision making as well as argument 
evaluation, reasonable discourse and reasoned judgment. 
“The ideas of economists and political 
philosophers, both when they are right 
and when they are wrong are more 
powerful than is commonly understood. 
Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. 
Practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually slaves of some 
defunct economist.”  (J.M. Keynes) 
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Before concluding let me return to the point I made at the beginning. The increasing 
acceptance of critical thinking as a central educational concept positions those of us involved in 
critical thinking to significantly affect the intellectual landscape. The skepticism towards 
economics caused by the 2008 crash has also created a more receptive public environment for 
critiques of economics. The popular interest in the heuristics and bias literature also provides an 
opportunity to discuss and explore standards of rationality. Because many of the cognitive 
psychology researchers in this area are interested in 
the application of their research, often under the 
rubric of “de-biasing,” it should be feasible to find 
appropriate colleagues for this effort (Fischoff 
1981). In addition because critical thinking is 
fundamentally an applied discipline focused on 
application, the development of a broad concept of 
applied rationality should not become mired in theoretical minutia that characterizes so much of 
philosophical theorizing. 
The Critical Thinking Project with the addition of a focus on rational decision making has 
the potential to make a crucial contribution to the individual and collective well being and even 
the future of the world. 
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